The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread (And What Results) by Zachary S Davis & Benjamin Frankel

Author:Zachary S Davis & Benjamin Frankel [Davis, Zachary S & Frankel, Benjamin]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, Nuclear Warfare, Weapons, Political Science, General
ISBN: 9781000199703
Google: w5UBEAAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 53371519
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2020-12-01T00:00:00+00:00

TOWARD A RICHER THEORY OF NUCLEAR BEHAVIOR

Rational deterrence theory has an undeniable advantage over other candidate theories of nuclear behavior. It is parsimonious and embedded in a sophisticated and generalizable understanding of international relations. But its very parsimony limits its application, at least in the realm of nuclear policy. Because it only considers systemic factors, it cannot explain adequately problems couched at a different level of analysis: for example, variations in U.S. nuclear operations over time. Its usefulness as a reliable predictor of nuclear behavior in proliferating states is limited precisely because it concludes that variances in such behavior are inconsequential. Yet its own sanguine conclusions about proliferation depend, in part, on the proliferators adopting the appropriate nuclear operations.

A more useful theory should incorporate systemic and sub-systemic factors. While such a theory is less parsimonious, it offers the prospects of more nuanced explanation and, perhaps, more useful prediction. Where parsimony yields uncertain bias, there are powerful reasons for including more relevant factors, regardless of their origin.

This analysis is an early cut at this project. I identified the three domains which mediate the causal relationship between nuclear weapons and political behavior, and I specified how key features from each domain influence nuclear behavior. The strategic systems domain affects the manageability of the arsenal because not all nuclear weapons are equal. A small nuclear arsenal consisting of unwieldy devices more resembling engineering experiments than weapons of war grants a proliferator a very different capability than does one based on a modern arsenal consisting of prompt, survivable, and accurate missiles. The former offers at best an existential deterrent option; the latter could provide more flexible, and potentially more useable, options. Similarly, a delegative command and control system augurs very different nuclear behavior from an assertive one; in a crisis, a country with delegative control faces sharper risks of an accidental or unauthorized use while a country with assertive control may be unable to execute a nuclear strike at all.

These factors help determine whether proliferation is likely to constitute a major threat to regional or global stability. The same small vulnerable arsenal that leads to crisis instability in a hostile strategic environment can be a minimal threat in a pacific strategic environment. A hard-pressed new proliferator may feel compelled to adopt a time-urgent doctrine which itself will constrain its options in a crisis. A more secure proliferator may feel free to tolerate a nuclear posture that, though vulnerable, makes for moderate political behavior (for example, developing the capability to build nuclear weapons but not actually crossing the threshold into doing so).

The third domain, strategic culture, is at once the most ambiguous and the most intriguing in its effects. If strategic systems and the strategic environment set broad parameters for choice, strategic culture influences the way the nuclear proliferator will frame those choices. A long history of military obedience will make a state more disposed to respond to environmental incentives for delegating control over nuclear operations. Domestic political pathologies may inhibit the way a proliferator manages vulnerabilities in its arsenal.

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